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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SIDNEY STEVENS IMPLEl\IENT COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and .Appellant,

vs.
C. K. BOWERBANK,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and the defendant are the owners of
tracts of land situate on the East side of Ogden Avenue
between Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth Streets in Ogden City. The parties, on the 11th day of December,
1945, entered into a party wall agreement. (Exhibit A)
The agreement provided that the party wall, when constructed, should be one (1) foot in thickness with piers
installed therein for the support of the roof, one-half
of which was to stand upon the lot of each party for
the full length of one hundred (100) feet. The agreement recites that the plaintiff was to erect a building
upon its lot, the South wall of which was to be used as
a party wall between the parties.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The plaintiff had employed H. J. Craven &. ~o?s,
Engineers, to survey the premises and locate the diVISion
line.
The agreement grants the defendant the right to
use the party wall for the whole length, or any part
thereof, in relation to the construction of a building
which the defendant may thereafter construct, and to
sink joists into the wall to the extent of six (6) inches.
The agreement further provided that:
' ' That said party of the second part * * * shall
as soon as the building to be constructed by
the party of the first part shall have been completed to the point where the total cost of the
South wall shall have been ascertained, shall pay
to said party of the first part or its assigns the
full one-half of the total cost of said South wall."
The agreement also provided that the boundary line
fixed by plaintiff's surveyor and marked upon the premises was to be considered the center line of the South
wall, half of which was to be constructed on each side
of said line so established.
The agreement provided for other usual provisions
ordinarily contained in party wall agreements, which
are not material to the issues in this case.
Prior to the construction of the wall, it was ascertained by the defendant that the survey made by H. J.
Craven & Sons was not the correct survey and did not
establish the true division line between the properties
of the plaintiff and defendant. (Tr. 105) The defendant
employed William Stowe, a licensed surveyor and an
2
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engineer employed by Ogden City, to s1n·ye~' the land of
the defendant and to establish the diYision line between
the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, and by
such sniTey it was discovered that the line established
by Craven was upon the property owned by the defendant and South of where it should have been. (Tr. 108109) This fact was called to the attention of the plaintiff's officers and by mutual agreement between the
officers of the plaintiff and the defendant, the true division line between the properties was established and
agreed upon by the parties, and the division line was
marked upon the sidewalk in front of said properties
adjacent to the property line. It was then agreed by
the parties that the center of the wall should be constructed on that line so established. (Tr. 107-108) Plaintiff proceeded with the construction of its building and
the party wall.
After the completion of the building, the defendant
discovered that the party wall, being the South wall of
plaintiff's building, was built 10% inches South of the
division line as established by the Stowe survey and
wholly upon the property of the defendant. (Tr. 109)
The wall was constructed during the winter time, and
the survey mark was covered with snow, scaffolding,
and other debris, and the defendant consequently did
not discover the error in its location until after the removal of the snow, scaffolding, and debris, and after
the completion of the wall. (Tr. 116-117)
Upon completion of the party wall, the plaintiff
claimed the cost thereof amounted to $4,435.00, and demanded that the defendant pay one-half of this sum.

3
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The defendant refused to pay this amount contending
that such sum was not the cost of the wall. After the
completion of the wall, the defendant obtained from C.
B. Lauch Construction Company, plaintiff's contractor,
a statement showing that the total cost of the party wall
was $2,530.00, (Exhibit 1) and offered to pay the plaintiff one-half thereof, being the sum of $1,265.00. The
plaintiff refused to accept this amout and filed suit to
recover the sum of $2,217 .50. The defendant claimed
that the party wall was built entirely upon his land,
the center line of which was 103,4 inches South of the
true property line. The defendant filed an answer to
plaintiff's complaint, alleging that the total cost of
the wall was $2,530.00 and admitted that he was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $1,265.00, and filed
a counterclaim in the amount of $1,000.00 for damages
suffered by reason of the plaintiff constructing the
party wall on land of the defendant, and asserting that
the defendant was only indebted to the plaintiff, therefore, in the amount of $350.00. The case was tried by
a jury and was submitted by the Court to the jury upon
the four special interrogatories as set forth in appellants brief, and the interrogatories were answered as
set forth in said brief. (Page 6) On the 30th day of
December, 1948, judgment was entered in favor of the
plaintiff in the sum of $1,375.00, with interest, and for
the defendant judgment was entered as damages which
he suffered for the encroachment on his land in the
amount of $151.42, with interest, which was set off
against the amount of plaintiff's judgment, leaving a
balance due the plaintiff in the amount of $1,223.58,
with interest from May 1, 1946.
4
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The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. The
motion was denied on the g-round that it was not filed
in time. The plaintiff then moYed the court to file a
motion for a new trial beyond the statutory time. This
motion \Yas supported by an affidavit of plaintiff's counsel. Defendant objected to granting of motion. The
objection thereto was supported by affidavit of defendant's counsel denying material allegations set forth in
the affidant of plaintiff's counsel. The court then denied the motion and refused to grant the relief sought
thereby.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
DEFENDANT IS NOT BOUND BY STATEMENT MADE BY BIDDER TO PLAINTIFF QUO'l,ING COST OF WAI.JL, DEFENDANT NOT BEING A
PARTY TO SUCH BID OR AGREEMENT FOR CONSTRUCTION OF PLATNTIF:B,'S BUILDING PlJRSUANT TO SUCH BID.
The party wall agreement executed between the
plaintiff and defendant, a copy of which is attached to
plaintiff's complaint and marked "Exhibit A" (Page
003) (also plaintiff's "Exhibit A") was executed by the
plaintiff and the defendant on the 11th day of December, 1945. The agreement provided for the construction
of a party wall, one foot in thickness. The agreement
further provided:
'' rhe said party of the second part * - * shall as
soon as said building to be constructed by the
party of the first part shall have been completed
5
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to a point where the total cost of the South wall
shall have been ascertained, shall pay to the party
of the first part, or its asl::!igns, the full one-half
of the total cost ot said South wall."
It will be noted that general specifications in relation to the construction of plaintiff's building were
prepared by Art Shreeve, plaintiff's Architect, (plaintiff's Exhibit B) which bears date of December 1st,
1945. rrhere is, however' an addendum to these specifications, shown in this exhibit on the last page thereof,
dated December 26, 1945. The contract for the construction of the building was entered into between C.
B. Lauch Construction Company and Sidney Stevens
Implement Company, the plaintiff herein, on the 26th
day of December, 1945. The general specifications
(plaintiif's Exhibit B, page 19) provided that:
''All exterior walls shall be 12 inch walls, partitions 6 inches. Front elevation shall be Face
Brick, selected by Architect, balance of exterior
walls common brick, and partitions, tile.''
The specifications (plaintiff's Exhibit B, page 20}
provided that the contractor is to state in his bid a lump
sum amount for the construction of the South wall.
The bid of C. B. Lauch Construction Company bears
date of December 17, 1945. On the 18th day of December, 1945, a letter was written by C. B. Lauch (plaintiff's
Exhibit D) in which a quotation for a brick walt with
excavation, footings, and reinforced steel columns, according to plans and specifications, is addressed to the
plaintiff's Architect, quoting the sum of $4,435.00. This
6
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was prior to the signing of the contract between the
plaintiff and the Lauch Construction Company for the
construction of plaintiff's building. On the 26th day of
December, 19-!5, on the date contract was sig·ned, an
addendum was added to the contract (see last page
Plaintiff's Exhibit B) whereby a change was made in
the construction of the Exterior walls and which is as
follows:

''Exterior Walls: Change to read as follows:
Front elevation 12" face brick. Balance of walls
to be constructed of Lava Ash Blocks, as manufactured by the "Utah Concrete Pipe Company",
size 10" x 16". ''
The quotation given by C. B. Lauch Construction
Company, in connection with its bid, was based upon the
construction of a 12 inch brick wall, the specifications
being changed subsequent to the quotation and,
therefore, the quotation of the purported cost is not
material, under any circumstances, in determining the
cost of the wall.
It should be noted that the party wall agreement
provided for the construction of the party wall one foot
in thickness. The plaintiff failed to carry out the
terms of its agreement with the defendant in that the
wall actually constructed was but 10 inches in thickness.
The defendant asserts that an attempt on the part of
the plaintiff to fix the cost of the wall prior to the construction of it, violates the terms of the party wall agreement in that the agreement expressly states:

''Party of the second part * * * shall as soon as
the building to be constructed by party of the first
7
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part shall hatve been completed to the point where
the total cost of the South wall shaU have ~een
ascertained shall pay * * * the full one-half of the
total cost.''
While the defendant asserts that he is not bound
by the contract entered into between the plaintiff and
C. B. Lauch Construction Company, insofar as the quotation for the cost of the wall is concerned, still there is
no evidence before the Court as to any compliance by
the contractor with the plaintiff, as provided in its
specifications, in fixing the total cost of the South wall
of the building after the change in construction from a
12 inch brick wall to a 10 inch Lava Ash Block wall.
There is, however, before the Court, evidence introduced by the defendant, that after the construction
of the wall, the defendant requested the C. B. Lauch
Construction Company to furnish him a statement of
costs of the wall to the plaintiff (see testimony of .Jack
Hilton, Tr. 31-32 and 33). Hilton, Superintendent of the
C. B. Lauch Construction Company, after taking into
consideration the entire contract price of the building,
computed the cost of the party wall to be $2,530.00 (defendant's Exhibit 1). The construction of the party wall
was not completed until about May, 1946 (Tr. 31). Jack
Hilton was employed by C. B. Lauch Construction Company as Superintendent upon the construction of the
party wall in April, 1946. ( Tr. 23) The statement which
was furnished the defendant setting forth the cost of
the party wall, was given by Jack Hilton at the direction
of C. B. Laueh. (Tr. 47) The plaintiff is bound by the
statement of his own contractor establishing the cost
of the party wall.
8
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The defendant has been at all times willing to pay
for the one-half of the artual cost of the party wall, but
has been unwilling· to pay the amount which plaintiff
seeks to impose upon him, which is excessive. It should
be obseiTed that the contract cost of the entire building
includes the rost of construction of the other three walls,
the cement floor, roofing, wiring, plumbing, stairs, exca,?ation, back filling, Yanlt, ramp, lathing, plastering,
painting·, hardware, glazing (including plate glass windows on front of building·), face brick on front, and all
steel (except structural steel to be furnished by plaintiff, but installed by contractor), and all necessary materials and work to be done in connection with the completion of plaintiff's building. The plaintiff seeks to
establish the cost of the party wall to be in excess of 14
of the entire cost of plaintiff's building. Such cost is
obviously exorbitant and beyond all reason.
If the cost of a party wall were permitted to be established by such a method where the adjoining owner
was not a party to the building contract, under plaintiff's
theory, any price which was fixed by the parties to the
contract between themselves, would establish the cost
of such wall, which the other party would be obligated
to pay. Defendant contends that this is not good law.
Such a method would open the doors to collusion and
fraud. In other words, the defendant believes that he
has not been billed for his portion of the total cost of
the wall, but for the cost of the wall and a substantial
portion of the balance of plaintiff's building.
The Court instructed the jury upon the method of
determining the cost of the party wall as follows: (023).

9
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''You are instructed that under the terms and
provisions of the party wall agreement entered
into between the plaintiff and the defendant, the
defendant agreed to pay to the plaintiff· one-half
( lJ2) of the costs incurred by plaintiff in the construction of the party wall and in this connection
you are instructed that cost and reasonable market value are not synonymous terms. The word
''cost'' as used in this agreement means the
actual cost to the plaintiff for the construction
of said party wall. That is, the amount which
the plaintiff actually paid to the contractor for
the construction of the wall in question. This
amount includes not only the cost of the materials
and labor to the contractor, but in addition
thereto the amount he charged for his overhead
and profits. So it is for you to determine from
all of the evidence in this case what was the
amount which the contractor charged the plaintiff for the building of the wall.''
Upon such instruction and after deliberation, the jury,
from the evidence concluded that the total cost of the
wall to the plaintiff amounted to $2,750.00, thereby fixing
the amount which the defendant was to pay in the sum
of $1,375.00.

POINT II.
THE COST OF THE PARTY WALL IS ESTABLISHED BY TESTIMONY OJ!, CONTRACTOR
CONSTRUCTING SAME AFTER COJ\fPLETION OF
WALL AND SUBSTANTIATED BY OTHER COMPETENT CONTRACTORS.
The testimony of Jack Hilton, employed as Superintendent in the construction of the Stevens Building, was

10
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conclusiYe t=-vidence to. establish the actual cost to the
plaintiff of the party wall. All of the figures of Mr.
Lauch which were used in the preparation of the bid
were offered in evidence and Jack Hilton computed the
cost of the party wall upon such fig11res, including the
overhead of the contractor and the percentage of profit
charged on the entire building. (Defendant's exhibit 3,
Tr. 96¥2 and 97).
Testimony was given by other contractors as to the
cost of the party wall. Fred Carr, Jr., of the Clarence
Waterfall Company, computed the total actual cost at
$2,348.87. (Defendant's Exhibits 5, Tr. 57). Attention
should be called to the fact that Carr figured the profit
of the contractor at 15% rather than 10% which was
used by Lauch in his estimate. (Tr. 60)
Another contractor, Andrew Isaakson, computed the
cost of the wall to the plaintiff at approximately $2,500.00 (Tr. 89). The testimony of these two contractors substantiates the evidence given by Jack Hilton as to the
cost of the party wall and is proper evidence to establish cost of the wall.
Kempf vs. Ranger
155 NW 1059. (Minn.)
It was brought out on cross-examination of Mr. C.
H. Stevens, President of Sidney Stevens Implement
Company, that the full contract price of the building
bad never been paid Lauch Construction Company, and
that Lauch Construction Company had filed suit in the
District Court of Weber County against Sidney Stevens
11
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Implement Company for the sum of $1,579.52. (Tr. 18)
Plaintiff's Counsel attempts to use this fact as a reason
why Jack Hilton' Lauch's Superintendent, appeared as
a witness for the defendant. We contend that this is
no proper deduction on the part or such counsel. Jack
Hilton is now no longer employed by C. B. Lauch Construction Company, nor was he in the employment of
such ,Company at the time his testimony was given in
the trial of this action. (Tr. 22) It is true that C. B.
Lauch had gone to Boise, Idaho, to engage in the contracting business. The plaintiff, however, had the opportunity of taking Lauch's deposition, but failed to do
so. It is true that C. B. Lauch wrote a letter (Plaintiff's
Exhibit L) to one of the counsel for the defendant on
the 17th day of November, 1947, just prior to the commencement of this action, which purported to state the
cost of the party wall as $3,127.00. Mr. Young requested defendant's counsel to produce this, and then
offered it in evidence. The testimony of Jack Hilton,
(Tr. 35) however, reveals that at the time that Lauch
wrote this letter, he did not have the data concerning
the construction of the Sidney Stevens Building; that
all of this information, and even at the time of the trial
of this case, was in the hands of Jack Hilton.
POINT III.
THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE
PROPERTIES OF THE PARTIES WAS ESTAB·
LISHED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, COMPRO·
MISING A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
ARISING AFTER EXECUTION OF PARTY WALL
AGREEMENT AND ORA VE,N SURVEY, AND DOES
NOT COME WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

12
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It is to be admitted that the surveys of the two surveyors, that is Craven, who "'as employed by the plaintiff, and Stowe, who \YHs employed by the defendant,
conflicted. There was eYidence introduced in relation
to these conflicts by both parties. Plaintiff, however,
contends that the parties, by the terms of the party
wall agreement, established a line by mutual agreement
based upon the Craven su1Tey. Defendant's position,
is that prior to the time of commencing construction of
the building, it '"as ascertained that an error was made
in the Craven Survey. The fact of this error was called
to the attention of the officers of the plaintiff corporation. (Tr. 105-106-107 and 149) Mr. Frank J. Stevens,
Jr., Secretary and Treasurer of the plaintiff corporation, testified that when such discrepancy was called
to his attention, he (Stevens) and Bowerbank, in company with the architect, jlr. Lauch, and Mr. Richardson (l\Ir. Lauch's superintendent at the time) went to
the building location and agreed upon a boundary line
between the properties and made a mark on the sidewalk opposite the line agreed upon (Tr. 149-150), and
agreed that the party wall should be so constructed that
the center of the same would be upon such boundary
line.
The evidence also shows, through the testimony of
Mr. Bowerbank, that prior to the time that Frank J.
Stevens, Jr., and he, went to locate the center line of the
party wall, a discussion was had in the office of the
Sidney Stevens ·Implement Company concerning the
same; In addition to Bowerbank and Frank J. Stevens,
Jr., being present, there was Stowe, the suveyor, and
C. H. Stevens, President of the Sidney Stevens Imple-
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ment Company. The evidence also shows that they
agreed at that time to use the Stowe survey (Tr. 107)
and C. H. Stevens, the President of the Sidney Stevens
Implement Company, sent Frank J. Stevens, Jr., Secretary and Treasurer, down to the lot line, and that the
foreman of the Lauch Construction Company was told
jointly by Frank J. Stevens, Jr., and Bowerbank where
to place the party wall, which was not upon the Craven
Survey, but upon a new line agreed upon two inches
North of Stowe survey. (Tr. 107).
Plaintiff contends that this oral agreement was in
violation of the Statute of Frauds and cites several
authorities in support. We submit that the cases cited
by the plaintiff are not in point with the instant case.
The cases cited hold that title or any interest in real
estate cannot be transferred or conveyed unless by written instrument. In this case there was a dispute as to
the location of the true boundary line between the
properties of the parties to this action. The dispute
did not arise until after the survey had been made by
Craven and after the execution of the party wall agreement. A new agreement fixing the boundary line was
entered into between the parties, which agreement superseded the prior one and which was executed by the
marking of the line and the instructions to the contractor
to proceed with the erection of the party wall on the line
agreed upon. Such oral agreement between adjoining
owners establishing a boundary line which was uncertain does not come within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, and does not violate the provisions of the
Laws of the State of Utah in relation to conveyance of
real estate, neither does it violate the parol evidence
rule.

14
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Tietjen Ys. Dobson,
69 ALR 1408

13~

SE

~~:2

(Georg-ia)

Tripp Ys. Bag-ley, 7-! Utah 57
276 Pac. 912
69 ALR 1417
Bemis Ys. Bradley, 139 Atl. 593 (:l\Iaine)
69 ALR 1399
8 Am. Jur. 801
69 ALR 1430
131 ALR 421
Defendant submits that the case of Tripp vs. Bagley,
74 Utah 57, cited by theplaintiff is favorable to the
defendant's position. This case holds that' where there
is a dispute about the true boundary line between property owners, a parol agreement establishing- such boundary line is valid and not within the Statute of Frauds.
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of rrripp vs.
Bagley, quotes with approval Tiffany on Real Property, Volume 1 (2d ed.) 294:

''An agreement between adjoining owners as
to the location of a boundary line, though merely
oral, is not, it is generally conceded, invalid as
being within the Statute of Frauds, provided the
agreement is followed by actual or constructive
possession by each of the owners up to the line
so agreed upon, and provided further, that the
proper location of the line is uncertain or in
dispute; the theory being that the agreement
does not, in such case involve any transfer of
title to land, but merely an application of the
language of the instruments under which the
owners claim.''

15
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The plaintiff and the defendant took constructive
possession of the land on each side up to the line so
agreed upon, by marking the line, and by instructing the
foreman of the Construction Company to construct the
center of the party wall upon such line.
The case of Bemis vs. Bradley above quoted, holds:
''An agreement fixing a boundary line under
the belief that it is the true line, when in fact it
is not, is not binding and may be set aside by
either party when the mistake is discovered,
unless some principle of estoppel prevents it, as
where the rights of innocent third parties have
intervened.''
"The weight of authority is that, where the
intention was to establish a line according to the
true boundary, and by mistake the parties agreed
upon a line which does not conform to such a
boundary, the line so agreed on is not conclusive
and the agreement may be set aside by either
party.''
Under the ruling in this case the defendant is not
bound by the designation of the boundary line between
the properties as surveyed by Craven when it was afterwards ascertained that there was a mistake in such survey.
POINT IV.
DEFENDANT SUFFERED DAMAGES BY ENCROACHMENT OF PARTY WALL UPON HIS
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PROPERTY AT LEAST TO THE l\IAHKET VALUE
OF L.A.XD TAI~EX BY SUCH ENCROACHMENT.
The Court permitted testimony as to the Yalue of
defendant's land upon whirh plaintiff encroached as
the measure of damag·es suffered by the defendant of
such eneroachment. The plaintiff contends that if the
defendant were entitled to damages, the measure of the
same should be the difference between the value of
defendant's property before and the value of the property after the encroaehment. Even if this method were
the proper method for determining the measure of damages, the only one who would be prejudiced by failure
to follow such method of determining the resulting damages, is the defendant himself. He would be entitled
at least to the value of the land by the encroachment.
The plaintiff cites 2 C. J. S. 33. The case cited in
support of the text statement is Goldsmidt vs. ~Iayor of
New York, et al, 14 App. Div. 135, 43 N. Y. S. 447.
This case substantiates the defendant's theory. While
such decision holds that the proper measure of damages
for a permanent encroachment is the difference in value
of the premises encroached upon befor:e and after such
encroachment, it implies that the damages suffered is
not only the value of the land taken, but may inelude
additional damages for diminution of value of the whole
of such premises. The defendant in the Goldsmidt case
claimed that the measure of damages was the actual or
market value of the land taken by the eneroachment.
The New York Court in the deeision states:
"It seems to be conceived by the defendant
that he is only liable here for the actual value of
the property, and the value is to be estimated by
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finding out how much of the land of the plaintiff
was worth a square foot, and charging the defendant for the number of square feet taken at
that rate. It is quite clear that this is entirely
erroneous. The depreciation to a city lot by encroachment upon it is not necessarily to be
measured in that way. It depends entirely upon
other considerations. If one builds a wall upon
his neighbor's land along the side or the rear
of it, it may be that the damages in that case
would be largely measured by the amount of land
taken, although other considerations would undoubtedly enter into the damages in such a case
as that, but where the encroachment is along the
front of the lot, it is easy to say that an entirely
different mode of reaching the damages must
be arrived at. The injury to plaintiff's premises
in such a case does not depend upon the amount
of the land taken but upon the value of the land
which is left, and that, as may easily be seen,
is governed not only by the situation and the
location of the land that is left, but by the place
where the encroachment is made. If a man
should put a column in the middle of his neighbor's City lot the damages would be much more
serious than it would be if the same erection
were put in the corner of the back end of the
lot and nobody would say that in either case the
tr:spasser was to be charged . simply with the
value of the square foot of land, which he had
taken possession of.''

POINT V.
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR· IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIE:B-, UNDER
SECTION 104-14-4.
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The plaintiff charges error on the part of the Court
in denying the motion for a new trial, upon the ground
that it was not filed within time, and cites error in not
permitting- the plaintiff to file a motion for a new trial
beyond the statutory time. Plaintiff quotes certain rules
. of the District Court which require the giving of notice
by the Cle~·k of the signing of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree. The rule which the plaintiff relies upon is Rule 17, which provides as follows:
''Notice by Clerk of Decision: When a decision is rendered by the Court upon a matter
under advisement or in the absence of counsel,
such counsel as were absent shall be given, by
the Clerk, written notice of the desicion by mail.
Such notices shall contain the name and number
of the case, a statement of the decision such as
'Defendant's demurrer overruled' or 'Judgment
for plaintiff'."
This rule applies to matters which are taken under
advisement and does not apply in the instant case, where
the verdict had already been rendered and plaintiff's
attorney at the direction of the Court, had prepared
and served upon defendant's counsel and had submitted
to the Court Findings and Judgment on verdict. The
case of
Cody vs. Cody, 47 Utah 456
154 Pac. 952

is decisive in this matter. In this decision it is stated:
''The party who prepares
Conclusions, and Decree, must
be deemed to have notice of
thence is not entitled to notice

the Findings and
of necessity * * *
the decision, and
thereof.''
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Plaintiff's counsel contends that he had no knowledge that the Findings and Judgment had been signed
on December 30, 1948, until several days afterwards,
and that immediately upon learning that they had been
signed, plaintiff's counsel prepared, served and filed
notice of intention to move for a new trial on January
6, 1949. The plaintiff's motion asking for relief to file
out of time, was supported by the affidavit of plaintiff's counsel (page 048). This was objected to by the
defendant and his objection was supported by affidavit
of Samuel C. Powell, one of counsel for the defendant,
(Page 044-045) countering and denying the material
allegations set forth in affidavit of plaintiff's counsel.
The Court considered the record and both affidavits and
denied the motion. The trial Court was the judge of the
facts and did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion.
CONCLUSION
The defendant asserts that thejudgment of the Trial
Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
SAMUEL C. POWELL,
SAMUEL H. BARKER,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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